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P.: Evidence--Former Testimony--Unavailability of Witness
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUAT.ERLY

EVIDENCE-FORMER TESTImONY-UNAVALABHITY OF WITNES.A witness for the defendant at a former trial on a charge of
homicide disappeared. Subpoenas were issued to the sheriffs of the
county in which he resided and the county to which he was reputed
to have gone. The first writ was returned unserved, the second
not returned. The defendant then attempted to introduce the
record of the former testimony of this witness. Held-this evidence was inadmissible because the unavailability of the witness
was not sufficiently established. However, the court goes on to
say in an able dictum that where a witness who testifies for the
accused disappears through no fault of the parties and after diligent search cannot be found so as to testify at a later trial of the
same party on the same issue, then the former testimony of the
absent witness is admissible in evidence. State v. Sauls, 124 S. E.
670 (W. Va. 1924).
In the matter of the admissibility of former testimony in evidence courts have sometimes made a distinction between civil
and criminal actions. The only plausible reason for such a distinction in this country and the reason generally assigned by the
courts is the Constitutional guaranty of the right of confrontation,
i. e., the right of the accused to have the witness subjected to cross
examination in his presence and before a jury. However the
modern tendency and better view is that such right is satisfied by
the former trial and the reproduction of the former testimony
under certain conditions is permissible. See Mattox v. United
States, 156 U. S. 239; People v. Gilhooley, 95 N. Y. Supp. 636, 80
N. E. 1116.
Textbooks quite generally state broadly that the evidence of a
witness given at a former trial between the same parties may be
introduced if the witness has died, become insane or sick and hence
unable to testify, is out of the jurisdiction, or has been kept away
from the trial by the opposite party. So far as civil actions are
concerned this is probably a sufficiently accurate statement of the
general rule. See People v. Elliott, 172 N. Y. 146, 64 N. E. 837;
Robbins v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. Rep. 650, 200 S. W. 525. Inability
to find the witness after a diligent search has been fovored by
many courts as an additional form of unavailability warranting
the admission of former testimony and may be said to represent
the better view and the weight -of authority. See Cuff v. Frazee,
etc. Co., 14 Ont. L. Rep. 263.
The weight of authority favors the extension of the above rule
in toto to criminal cases. See People v. Elliott, supra; Robertson
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v. State, 63 Tex. Crim. Rep. 286, 142 S. W. 233. Also WIGmORE,
EVIDENCE, § 1398 says, "In dealing with depositions and former testimony our courts have almost unanimously received them in
criminal prosecutions as not being obnoxious to the constitutional
provision.... Up to 1886, apparently the only contrary precedent
not overruled was an early Virginia case afterwards often cited...
This early Virginia ruling of so little weight in itself, served to keep
a doubt alive; and in the last generation a few ill-considered rulings in other jurisdictions have followed it. Apart from these rulings, it is well and properly settled that such evidence-assuming
always that there has been a due cross-examination-is admissible
for the State in a criminal prosecution without infringing the
Constitution."
The Virgina case to which Wigmore has reference is Finn's
Case, 5 Rand. 701 (Va. 1827). This was a criminal case in which
the witness at a former trial had since left the state. The court
refused to admit a record of his former testimony and indulged
itself in misleading dictum to the effect that former testimony
was admissible only in civil cases and there properly only where
the witness was dead. This dictum was followed without comment
in Brogy v. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. 722 (Va. 1853) and the
United States v. Angell, 11 Fed. 34.
However by 1909 the Virginia court seems to have perceived the
error in such a view for in Parks v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 807,
63 S. E. 462 a criminal case, the court admitted the former testimony of a deceased witness. In justifying its departure from the
precedent of its jurisdiction this court sets forth a strong argument
to the effect that such evidence is admissible in civil cases where
only property rights are at stake and since the safeguarding of
life and liberty is far more important than mere property rights
then such evidence should be admitted to secure the ends of justice. So it seems that the Virginia court has finally adopted the
majority view in the matter of admissibility of former testimony
in criminal cases and although it is dangerous to predict what a
court will do it is certainly highly probable that the Virginia court
is ready to go the full length in applying the rule of civil actions
in this matter to criminal cases.
The principal case would also seem to indicate that the West
Virginia court accedes to such a proposition and might be prepared to go a step farther in that it recognizes one of the most
questionable forms of unavailability, i. e., inability to find the former witness after a diligent search. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Volume
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III, § 1405 says, "If a witness has disappeared from observation, he
is in effect unavailable for the purpose of compelling his attendance" and later "Such a disappearance is shown by the party's
inability to find him after a diligent search." Although in the
principal case the evidence was excluded because the court did
not deem the mere issuance of writs to the sheriffs of two counties
a sufficiently diligent search, yet the dictum is so strong as to leave
little doubt as to the attitude of the court in this matter.
The chief difficulty with this form of unavailability is the possibility of collusion, but our court specifically guards against such
a thing when it says that the disappearance must have been
through no fault of the parties. So that the matter of collusion
and the question of the sufficiency of the search are quite properly
left to the discretion of the trial court.
It is to be noted that our court in taking this stand with the
better authorities expresses surprise in discovering that this proposition had never been established by judicial decision in this
jurisdiction.
-H. J. P.

LEASES-RENEWALS AND EXTENSIONS--NOTICE.-D leased certain property to P for five years with the right and privilege of
renewing said lease for an additional period of five years; subject
to the terms of the lease, except in event that if said lease being
renewed and continued for the additional period the monthly
rental shall be increased. Held, the lessee's failure to give the
lessor direct notice before expiration of first term of his intention
to continue the tenancy under the agreement will not deprive the
former of his right to continue the tenancy. Ammar v. Cohen,
123 S. E. 582, (W. Va. 1924).
In this case D brought an action of unlawful detainer. P asks
for an injunction restraining D from prosecuting the action and
further decreeing P's right to continue the possession thereof as
a tenant of D. The court granted the injunction and extended the
lease for the additional period, stating that direct notice of renewal was unnecessary. This holding was based upon the fact that
D had knowledge prior to the expiration of the lease, of P's intention to continue the tenancy. Whether or not the mere holding
over by the lessee after the expiration of the term is sufficient, or
whether direct notice or an affirmative act on the part of the
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